Complete Home & Office Legal Guide/Complete Home and Office Legal Guide (Chestnut) (1993).ISO/stat/ussct/padilla.asc

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-207
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. XAVIER V.
PADILLA et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the ninth circuit
[May 3, 1993]

  Per Curiam.

/* For any persons not familiar with this convetion, Per Curiam
translates to "by the Court" and is an opinion of the court
itself, which no particular Judge is identified as author. */

  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
adopted what it terms a "coconspirator exception" to the rule
regarding who may challenge the constitutionality of a search or
seizure.  Under its reasoning, a co-conspirator obtains a
legitimate expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes
if he has either a supervisory role in the conspiracy or joint
control over the place or property involved in the search or
seizure.  This exception, apparently developed in a series of
earlier decisions of the Court of Appeals, squarely contradicts
the controlling case from this Court.  We therefore reject it.

While patrolling Interstate Highway 10 in Casa Grande, Arizona,
Officer Russel Fifer spotted a Cadillac traveling westbound at
approximately 65 miles per hour.  Fifer followed the Cadillac for
several miles because he thought the driver acted suspiciously as
he passed the patrol car. Fifer ultimately stopped the Cadillac
because it was going too slowly.  Luis Arciniega, the driver and
sole occupant of the car, gave Fifer his driver's license and an
insurance card demonstrating that respondent Donald Simpson, a
United States customs agent, owned the Cadillac.  Fifer and
Robert Williamson, an officer who appeared on the scene to assist
Fifer, believed that Arciniega matched the drug courier profile.
Acting on this belief, they requested and received Arciniega's
permission to search the vehicle.  The officers found 560 pounds
of cocaine in the trunk and immediately arrested Arciniega.

 After agreeing to make a controlled delivery of the cocaine,
Arciniega made a telephone call to his contact from a motel in
Tempe, Arizona.  Respondents Jorge and Maria Padilla drove to the
motel in response to the telephone call, but were arrested as
they attempted to drive away in the Cadillac.  Like Arciniega,
Maria Padilla agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials.
She led them to the house in which her husband, respondent Xavier
Padilla, was staying.  The ensuing investigation linked Donald
Simpson and his wife, respondent Maria Sylvia Simpson, to Xavier
Padilla.   Respondents were charged with conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21
U. S. C. 846, and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute, in violation of 841(a)(1).  Xavier Padilla was also

charged with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, in
violation of 21 U. S. C. 848 (1988 ed. and Supp. III).
Respondents moved to suppress all evidence discovered in the
course of the investigation, claiming that the evidence was the
fruit of the unlawful investigatory stop of Arciniega's vehicle.
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona
ruled that all respondents were entitled to challenge the stop
and search because they were involved in "a joint venture for
transportation . . . that had control of the contraband."  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 22a.  The District Court reasoned that, as
owners, the Simpsons retained a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their car, but that the Padillas could contest the stop solely
because of their supervisory roles and their "joint control over
a very sophisticated operation . . . ."  Id., at 23a.  On the
merits, the District Court ruled that Officer Fifer lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop Arciniega, and granted respondents'
motion to suppress.   The Court of Appeals affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded.  The court began its analysis by
stating that in order -[t]o contest the legality of a search and
seizure, the defendants must establish that they had a
`legitimate expectation of privacy' in the place searched or the
property seized.  960 F. 2d 854, 858-859 (CA9 1992) (quoting
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 143-144 (1978)). The court then
recited its co-conspirator rule: a coconspirator's participation
in an operation or arrangement that indicates joint control and
supervision of the place searched establishes standing.  960 F.
2d, at 859 (citations omitted).

/* The problem here is that a third party is waiving the rights
of two other parties, resulting in a criminal conviction. */

Relying on a line of cases from the Ninth Circuit, the court held
that "because Xavier Padilla and Donald and Maria Simpson have
demonstrated joint control and supervision over the drugs and
vehicle and engaged in an active participation in a formalized
business arrangement, they have standing to claim a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the property searched and the items
seized." Id., at 860-861.  Donald Simpson established an
expectation of privacy "not simply because [he] owned the car
but also because he had a coordinating and supervisory role in
the operation.  He was a critical player in the transportation
scheme who was essential in getting the drugs across the border."
Id., at 860.  Maria Simpson established a privacy interest
because she "provided a communication link" between her husband,
Xavier Padilla and other members of the conspiracy, and "held a
supervisory role tying everyone together and overseeing the
entire operation."  Ibid.  Xavier Padilla established an
expectation of privacy because he "exhibited substantial control
and oversight with respect to the purchase [and] the
transportation through Arizona."  Ibid.  The court expressly
stated that it did not matter that Xavier was not present during
the stop, or that he could not exclude others from searching the
Cadillac.  Ibid.   The Court of Appeals could not tell from the
record whether Jorge and Maria Padilla shared any responsibility
for the enterprise, or whether they were "mere employees in a
family operation."  Id., at 861.  As a result, the court remanded
to the District Court for further findings on that issue.

  The Ninth Circuit appears to stand alone in embracing the
-coconspirator exception.-  We granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict, 506 U. S. ___ (1992), and now reverse.  It has long
been the rule that a defendant can urge the suppression of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment only if
that defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the challenged search or seizure.  Alderman v. United
States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.
S. 128, 131, n. 1, 133-134 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.
S. 98, 106 (1980).  We applied this principle to the case of
coconspirators in Alderman, in which we said:

      The established principle is that suppression of
      the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be
      successfully urged only by those whose rights were
      violated by the search itself, not by those who are
      aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging
      evidence.  Co-conspirators and codefendants have been
      accorded no special standing.  394 U. S., at 171-172.

  In Rakas, supra, police search of a car yielded a box of rifle
shells found in the glove compartment, and a sawed-off rifle
found under the passenger seat.  We held that petitioners, who
were passengers in the car and had no ownership interest in the
rifle shells or sawed-off rifle, and no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched, had suffered no invasion of their
Fourth Amendment rights.  See also Rawlings, supra; Soldal v.
Cook County, Illinois, 506 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at
6-8) (decided since the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
in the present case).

  The -coconspirator exception- developed by the Ninth Circuit
is, therefore, not only contrary to the holding of Alderman, but
at odds with the principle discussed above.  Expectations of
privacy and property interests govern the analysis of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure claims.  Participants in a criminal
conspiracy may have such expectations or interests, but the
conspiracy itself neither adds nor detracts from them.  Neither
the fact, for example, that Maria Simpson was the -communication
link- between her husband and the others, nor the fact that
Donald Simpson and Xavier Padilla were in charge of
transportation for the conspirators, has any bearing on their
respective Fourth Amendment rights.

  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  The
case is remanded so that the court may consider whether each
respondent had either a property interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment that was interfered with by the stop of the automobile
driven by Arciniega, or a reasonable expectation of privacy that
was invaded by the search thereof.  Alderman, supra; Rakas,
supra; Rawlings, supra; Soldal, supra.

It is so ordered.